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Abstract
This paper examines the association between the length of experience with statehood, or state
history, on the likelihood of state fragility. The argument is that the accumulation of knowledge by
state personnel, and the build up of experience within state institutions, allows the state to avoid
the exposure to recurrent crises, which is considered a symptom of weakness. The paper focuses on
sub-Saharan African countries and uses Probit estimation techniques. The analysis shows that state
history has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the state fragility index. This result is
robust after the inclusion of a variety of economic, political, institutional and historical variables. We
also use extreme fragility as our dependent variable. The Probit and Relogit estimations also show a
statistically signicant negative e¤ect of state history on extreme fragility. This is the case even after
the inclusion of control variables.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the association between state history and state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. State
history refers to the duration of experience with statehood, the depth of exposure to state level institutions,
and the protracted presence of state structures and systems. Some studies argue that societies with a long
established state enjoy a head start. This early start confers upon their state institutions and state personnel
advantages compared to newer states. Through a process of learning by doing, older states have a wider
pool of experienced public personnel who can fulll their duties in a more e¢cient manner. In addition,
the continuous operation of state institutions promotes attitudes consistent with bureaucratic protocol and
hierarchical discipline. This can enhance the organizational e¤ectiveness and the executive e¢ciency of
public administration which are critical for promoting economic, political, social, cultural and nancial
development.
This paper focuses on whether state history is one of the critical determinants of state fragility in sub-
Saharan Africa. A fragile state is characterized by weak ine¤ective governments, diminished state capacity,
ine¢cient public administration, poor public services, decient state legitimacy, inadequate legal frame-
works, growing absolute poverty, fractured national identities, lack of security, vulnerability to domestic
and international conicts, susceptibility to internal and external shocks, and proneness to crises. Fragile
states have economic institutions that sustain the conditions of stagnation and inequality in wealth, income,
and access to property ownership; social institutions that perpetuate the lack of access to public goods and
services; and political institutions that entrench exclusionary power coalitions that promote extreme fac-
tionalism. These institutions create conditions that increase the likelihood of exposure to crises. There is
ample documented evidence that several sub-Saharan African countries su¤er from these symptoms.
There are few studies that attempted to discover the determinants of state fragility. For instance,
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) explore whether economic, demographic, geographic and institutional factors
can predict state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors nd that institutions, in particular the
civil liberties index and revolutions, are signicant determinants of fragility. The authors conclude that
the probability for a country to be fragile increases with constraints on civil liberties and the number of
revolutions. Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016) also assess the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan
Africa using unexplored variables in the previous literature. The authors nd that political interference,
in the form of rent seeking and lobbying, increases the probability of state fragility by decreasing the
e¤ectiveness of governance.
Our paper contributes to this literature by arguing that one of the critical determinants of state fragility,
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that the literature largely ignored, is state history. The intuition is that the longer the experience of a
society with statehood, and the lengthier the exposure to state institutional structures, the less likely that
the country will experience the symptoms of state fragility. The accumulation of knowledge overtime by
state personnel allows state institutions to perform better, to be able to absorb any shocks, and to prepare
for any potential crises. In addition, the e¢ciency of public administration allows the state to expand its
capacity, to improve its e¤ectiveness, to solidify its legitimacy, and to consolidate its authority. All these
factors lead to a stronger, not a fragile, state.
To achieve its objective, the paper uses the state history index developed by Bockstette et al. (2002) as a
proxy for the long experience with statehood. The Probit estimation shows that state history has a negative
and statistically signicant e¤ect on the state fragility index. This result is robust even after the inclusion
of a variety of control variables such as real GDP per capita, diamond deposits, years under conict,
education, ethnic fractionalization, colonial indicators, slave exports, civil liberties, and other indicators
of institutional quality. The paper also uses extreme fragility as a dependent variable. The Probit and
the Rare Events Logistic, Relogit, estimations conrm the statistically signicant negative e¤ect of state
history on extreme fragility.
This paper comes at the intersection of two strands of literature. The rst investigates the economic,
political, social, cultural, and nancial consequences of state history. The second attempts to uncover the
determinants of state fragility. The contribution of our paper is twofold. It is the rst attempt to examine
the e¤ect of state history on state fragility, within the literature that focuses on the consequences of the
length of experience with statehood. This paper is also the rst to consider state history as a factor in the
literature that focuses on the determinants of state fragility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature survey, section 3
includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical estimation, and section 5 concludes.
References and tables are included thereafter.
2 Literature
Some studies argue that the experience of the state, determined by its longevity or period in existence, can
a¤ect economic development. These studies argue that older states enjoy advantages that newer ones do not.
For instance, Bockstette et al. (2002) develop an index of the depth of experience with state institutions, or
state antiquity, for a large set of countries. The authors show that state antiquity has a positive signicant
e¤ect on economic growth, output per worker, political stability and institutional quality. Chanda and
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Putterman (2007) show that early states and old agrarian societies, like China and India, began to catch
up with earlier industrializers while the new states experienced slow economic growth. To prove this, the
authors provide evidence that state history has a positive e¤ect on urbanization and population density in
1500, a signicant negative e¤ect on economic development in 1960 conrming a reversal of fortune during
the era of European expansion, and a signicant positive e¤ect on income per capita in 1980 conrming
that the reversal was being undone. Borcan et al. (2018) construct a data set on state history from the
emergence of states before the Common Era to 2000. The authors develop a theoretical framework where
accumulated state experience increases aggregate productivity, while newer inexperienced states can also
achieve higher productivity by learning from older ones. The empirical analysis shows that state history
has a hump-shaped relationship with technology adoption in 1500, population density in 1500, urbanization
in 1500, technology adoption in 2000, and income per capita in 2000. The authors conclude that the hump
shape indicates that newer states can enjoy a higher level of economic development compared to older ones.
Other studies explore the association between state history and nancial development. The argument is
that nancial systems are the outcomes of a process shaped by the ability of the state to administer public
nances, to regulate nancial markets and nancial institutions, and to legislate for nancial transactions.
Long standing states, with more experienced and trained civil servants, are more likely to be better equipped
to formulate e¤ective rules that contribute to nancial development. These states are also expected to be
more competent in the e¢cient use of funds, tax collection, and government administration which are
critical for the emergence of the contemporary nancial architecture.
In this context, Ang (2013) explore whether di¤erences in nancial development between countries can be
explained by the depth of state experience. The analysis shows a signicant positive e¤ect of state antiquity
on the ratio of private credit to GDP. The author nds that state antiquity is a signicant determinant
of nancial development even after using di¤erent indicators for state history and nancial development,
controlling for potential endogeneity, and including other determinants of nancial development. Ang and
Fredriksson (2018) expand this analysis to examine the relationship between state history, legal origins and
nancial development. The authors nd that, relative to common law, countries with adaptable German
and Scandinavian civil law initially exhibit lower nancial development. However, the longer the history of
statehood in these countries the higher is their level of nancial development. This is not found to be the
case in countries with a rigid French civil law. Ang and Fredriksson (2017) argue that countries with longer
state history at the time of colonization were better able to implement the legal practices transplanted
by their colonizers. The authors show that common law countries have weaker climate change policies
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and labor regulations compared to civil law countries, and the di¤erence is inated by a longer statehood
experience.
Other studies examine the e¤ect of state history on the extent of ethnic diversity. The argument is
that national identity has been considered the linchpin in the process of state consolidation as it provides
the common ground for interaction between citizens from di¤erent backgrounds. Thus, countries that have
gone through a lengthy state-formation process are better able to forge a common identity which diminishes
the degree of stratication. Bleaney and Dimico (2016) nd that ethnic fractionalization is higher in less
historically legitimate and, to a lesser extent, in states with a shorter history. The authors also show that
ethnic polarization is much more weakly associated with these factors, which implies that large minorities
are more resistant to absorption into the majority group than small ones.
Some studies investigate the e¤ect of state history on the exposure to and timing of colonialism. Ertan
et al. (2016) study the determinants of the occurrence and timing of colonization by European powers.
The authors show that societies who were less likely to be colonized had longer histories of agriculture and
statehood and higher levels of technology adoption in 1500.
Other studies explore the e¤ect of the long exposure to statehood on the likelihood of conict. The
argument is that an accumulation of experience with state institutions may lead to improved state capacity
and enhanced institutional capabilities over time. These factors allow these countries to be better equipped
to maintain law and order, have stronger police presence, have e¢cient law enforcement, have the ability to
negotiate compromises, are better able to allocate scarce resources, are better able to protect property, and
have legal courts capable of settling disputes peacefully. Depetris-Chauvin (2016) show that the historical
exposure to centralized institutions has a strong causal e¤ect on the likelihood of conict, and that countries
with a long state history are less prone to experience conict when hit by a negative agricultural productivity
shock.
These studies conclude that state history is favorable to economic and nancial development, but has
an adverse e¤ect on fractionalization and conict. These ndings allow us to expand the previous analyses
to also consider the e¤ect of state history on state fragility. This is because state fragility is more likely to
be a symptom in countries that su¤er from a high level of poverty, a high level of diversity, and a low level
of institutional quality.
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3 Data
The countries included in the analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Cote
dIvoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are included in table 1. The description of
the variables and their data sources are included in table 2. The available data are organized as a panel that
covers the 19922007 period and is composed of two cross-sections, over 19921999 and 20002007. The
dependent variable is the fragility dummy in 1999 and 2007, that is, in the nal year of each cross-section.
For those variables for which we have yearly information, we consider their average value in 19921999 and
20002007.
3.1 State Fragility
We use the state fragility index as our dependent variable. This is a binary variable that assumes the
value 1 for International Development Association (IDA) countries in the bottom two Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) quintiles or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise. Bertocchi and Guerzoni
(2011, 2012) construct another indicator for extreme state fragility. This is a restriction of the fragility
criterion from bottom two quintiles to the bottom quintile. In the case of extreme state fragility, the binary
variable assumes the value of 1 for IDA countries in the bottom CPIA quintile or without a CPIA rating, 0
otherwise. The detailed denition is included in Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011, 2012), Kodila-Tedika and
Asongu (2016), and Kodila-Tedika and Bolito-Losembe (2014).
3.2 State History
We use the State Antiquity variable developed by Bockstette et al. (2002) who include a detailed description
of the construction of the indicator.
3.3 Controls
Several control variables are used in the analysis to check the robustness of the results. These are economic,
political, historical, cultural and institutional factors that are argued to be potential determinants of state
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fragility by previous studies.
The rst variable used is Real Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita which is derived from the Penn
World Tables version 8.0. The logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product per capita is used in the analysis.
The analysis also includes educational attainment which is proxied by "primary enrollment over o¢cial
school age population" derived from the World Bank Education Statistics 5.31 .
The ethnic fractionalization indicator is derived from Alesina et al. (2003)2 . Fractionalization measures
the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from di¤erent ethnic groups. We
also use the number of years under armed conicts, derived from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset3 . In
addition, we include an indicator of natural endowments which is the number of diamond deposits derived
from Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012).
We include some historical control variables in the analysis such as the colonial indicator which reects
the identity of the colonial power. The data distinguishes between British, French, Portuguese, and other
European colonial powers. This data is derived from La Porta et al. (1999). We also use political status
which is a categorical variable assuming value 2 for colonies, 1 for dependencies, and 0 for independent
countries. This is derived from Bertocchi and Canova (2002). The paper also uses a variable for the total
number of slaves exports, normalized for land area, during the period 1400-1900. This variable is derived
from Nunn (2008).
Finally, we include some institutional quality indicators, such as the civil liberties index derived from
Freedom House of 2008. We also use the government e¤ectiveness index, the rule of law index, and the
voice and accountability index derived from Worldwide Governance Indicators of 2009.
4 Estimation
This section empirically estimates the e¤ect of state history on state fragility as follows
P (StateFragilityi = 1) = G (+ StateHistoryi +Xi + "i) (1)
where StateFragilityi is the state fragility index in country i. StateHistoryi is the state antiquity
index in country i, and Xi is a vector of economic, political, historical and institutional control variables.
Since the dependent variable takes only two values, we use Probit estimation techniques. G( ) is the
1http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/
2The dataset can be found at: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html
3https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conict/UCDP-PRIO/
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cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Given the dichotomous distribution
of the variable of interest, we have a choice between a Logit or a Probit model. It is worth noting that the
results of the two models do not diverge except for very large samples as shown in Morimune (1979), and
Davidson and MacKinnon, (1984). A priori, the question of the choice between the two models is of little
importance. Our preference is to use the Probit model, as is standard in other studies (e.g. Amemiya, 1981).
Parameter estimation is carried out using the maximum likelihood estimator. We start by conducting an
outlier analysis using the Hadi (1992) technique. The Hadi (1992) tests indicate there are no outliers.
Table 3 includes the results of the Probit estimation. The basic result is included in column 1 without
any control variables. The results show that state history has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on
state fragility. The marginal e¤ect imply that a unit change in state history decreases the probability of
state fragility by more than 92%. We also add a variety of control variables, such as real GDP per capita,
education, conict, diamond deposits, and ethnic fractionalization in the subsequent columns. The results
show that real GDP per capita has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect, but the coe¢cient loses its
signicance after adding the education variable. This indicates that even though fragility can be attributed
to poverty, some relatively wealthier countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been plagued by corruption, rent
seeking and predatory activities. These factors can create dysfunction that leads to state weakness. The
primary enrollment variable is included because educational attainment is expected to be associated with a
higher demand for checks and balances, democratization, and improved government quality. The education
variable is, however, shown to be insignicant.
In table 3, the conict variable shows a signicant positive e¤ect while diamond deposits and ethnic
fractionalization do not seem to have a consistently signicant coe¢cient. This indicates that previous
involvement in armed conicts makes a country more prone to current conicts, which is symptomatic
of state fragility. This seems to be more important than other factors that are known to induce conict
such as ethnic diversity or the natural resource curse. It is also worth noting that the marginal e¤ects of
state history increase as we add more control variables in table 3. We also include the results of the linear
probability model in the last column of table 3 as a benchmark. The results are similar to those of the
Probit model.
In table 4, we add the institutional variables to the list of indicators previously considered. The intuition
is that even though fragility can be attributed to poverty, the symptoms of weakness only occur when dire
economic conditions are combined with low quality state institutions that cannot contain the grievances
and struggles caused by either an inequitable distribution of scarce resources or an unequal access to
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institutions. Table 4 shows that, in all specications, state history has a statistically signicant negative
coe¢cient. The results also show that constraints to civil liberties has a signicantly positive e¤ect, but the
coe¢cient loses its signicance after we add other institutional variables. Government e¤ectiveness show
a negative coe¢cient that is highly signicant even when we include other institutional indicators. The
rule of law and voice and accountability also have signicant negative coe¢cients, but their coe¢cients lose
their signicance once we add other institutional variables.
Table 5 add historical variables such as the colonial dummies and the number of slave exports. Historical
factors, especially colonialism and the slave trades, are found to be particularly critical for contemporary
economic and political outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. Several studies emphasize the consequences of
colonialism on the articial character of states after independence, the dependence on the colonial power
after decolonization, the haphazard nature of borders, the division of ethnic homelands, the establishment
of persistent extractive institutions, the extraction of local resources, the metropoles partiality toward
minorities, and other factors that contribute to state fragility. Slavery is also found to have a persistent
e¤ect on a­icted countries. Some studies found that slavery hindered the formation of larger communities
and broader ethnic identities. Thus, the slave trades were a critical factor in sub-Saharan Africas high level
of ethnic stratication, conict and weak states today. Table 5 shows that none of the coe¢cients of the
historical variables have a signicant e¤ect on state fragility. However, the state history variable continues
to exhibit a statistically signicant negative e¤ect in all specications.
Table 6 and 7 use extreme fragility as the dependent variable. The Probit estimation in table 6 conrms
the previous ndings. The coe¢cient of state history shows a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on
extreme fragility in all specications. In this context, extreme fragility is considered a rare event since the
binary dependent variable have fewer ones than zeros. Thus, we apply the Rare Events Logistic Regression,
Relogit, estimation techniques. This is because popular statistical procedures, such as Logistic regression,
can underestimate the probability of rare events. Table 7 conrms the previous ndings and show a
signicantly negative coe¢cient for state history in most specications.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the association between the length of experience with statehood, or state history, on
the probability of state fragility. The argument is that the accumulation of knowledge by state personnel
over time, and the build up of experience within state institutions, allows the state to avoid the exposure to
recurrent crises, which is considered a symptom of weakness. The paper uses Probit estimation techniques
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and nd that state history has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the state fragility index. This
result is robust after the inclusion of a variety of economic, political, institutional and historical variables.
We also use extreme fragility as our dependent variable. The Probit and Relogit estimations conrm the
previous ndings of a statistically signicant negative e¤ect of state history. This is the case even after the
inclusion of control variables as well.
This line of research can be extended to explore the economic, political, social and institutional channels
through which state history a¤ects state fragility. This proposed approach would have very important policy
implications as it allows policy makers to focus on the factors through which state longevity ensures the
proper functioning of a stronger state.
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Fragility 90 0.4666667 0.5016826 0 1
State History 82 0.5197642 0.1553638 0.1666667 0.9218107
Real GDP per capita 94 7.334436 0.8997084 5.616685 9.690198
Conict 96 1.791667 2.591146 0 8
Education 95 87.15206 31.13333 10.02623 193.8311
Diamond 96 0.3958333 0.491596 0 1
Fractionalization 94 0.6584255 0.2291998 0 0.9302
Slave Exports 94 3.592191 3.867984 -2.302585 8.818254
French Colony 96 0.3541667 0.4807706 0 1
Portugeuse Colony 96 0.1041667 0.3070802 0 1
British Colony 96 0.375 0.4866643 0 1
Other Colony 96 0.1666667 0.3746343 0 1
Civil LIberties 96 4.34561 1.344572 1.375 7
Political Status 84 1.785714 0.5165089 0 2
Government E¤ectiveness 96 2.784375 0.606536 1.41 4.23
Rule of Law 96 2.764687 0.685963 1.23 4.34
Voice and Accountability 96 2.873021 0.7402747 1.53 4.44
Table 1: Statistical Summaries
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Variable Description Source
Fragility Binary variable assuming value 1 for IDA countries
in the bottom two CPIA quintiles
or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise World Bank
Extreme fragility Binary variable assuming value 1 for IDA countries
in the bottom CPIA quintile
or without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise World Bank
Real GDP per capita logarithm of Real GDP per capita Penn World Tables
Diamonds Number of diamond deposits Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012)
Education Primary enrollment
over o¢cial school age population World Bank Education Statistics 5.3
Fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization index Alesina et al. (2003)
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties index Freedom House (2008)
Conicts Number of years under armed conicts UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset
British colony Value 1 for former British colonies,
0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1999)
French colony Value 1 for former French colonies
0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1999)
Portuguese colony Value 1 for former Portuguese colonies
0 otherwise La Porta et al. (1999)
Political status Value 2 for colonies,
1 for dependencies,
and 0 for independent countries Bertocchi & Canova (2002)
Government Government e¤ectiveness index
E¤ectiveness Worldwide Governance Indicators
Rule of Law Rule of law index Worldwide Governance Indicators
Voice Voice and Accountability index
and Accountability Worldwide Governance Indicators
State History State Antiquity index Bockstette et al. (2002)
Slave Exports Total number of slaves exported
during the period 1400-1900,
after normalization with land area Nunn (2008)
Table 2: Data Description and Data Sources
13
I II III IV V VI VII
State History -2.364** -2.741** -3.819*** -4.049*** -4.172*** -4.524*** -1.155
(1.017) (1.057) (1.185) (1.231) (1.286) (1.398) (0.323)
[ 0:9286] [ 1:070] [ 1:497] [ 1:582] [ 1:627] [ 1:732]
Real GDP per capita -0.612*** -0.355* -0.270 -0.330 -0.175 -0.050
(0.246) (0.258) (0.271) (0.294) (0.329) (0.060)
Conict 0.213*** 0.208*** 0.222*** 0.269*** 0.073
(0.071) (0.072) (0.074) (0.080) (0.021)
Education -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
Diamond 0.531 0.805** 0.176
(0.350) (0.390) (0.101)
Fractionalization 0.988 0.233
(1.002) (0.325)
Constant 1.078* 5.648*** 3.963** 3.823** 4.100** 2.581 1.147
(0.553) (1.934) (2.033) (2.018) (2.149) (2.607) (0.689)
Observations 76 75 75 74 74 72 72
Pseudo R-squared 0.0553 0.1286 0.2247 0.2300 0.2536 0.3150
Table 3: Probit Estimations.
Robust standard errors in ()
Marginal E¤ects in []
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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I II III IV V VI
State History -4.285** -4.520*** -5.067*** -3.676** -6.591*** -10.812***
(1.495) (1.399) (1.749) (1.380) (2.029) (5.745)
[ 1:376] [ 1:730] [ 1:714] [ 1:320] [ 0:983] [ 1:208]
Civil Liberties 1.108*** 1.126
(0.312) (1.709)
Political Status 0.082 -0.413
(0.353) (0.953)
Government E¤ectiveness -4.407*** -10.121
(1.179) (7.936)
Rule of Law -2.225*** 4.828
(0.562) (3.870)
Voice and Accountability -4.091*** -1.783
(1.168) (3.015)
Constant -3.665 2.451 4.839 5.298 10.439* -2.423
(4.041) (2.662) (4.608) (3.957) (6.028) (14.604)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Pseudo R-squared 0.5351 0.3155 0.7061 0.5411 0.7164 0.8146
Table 4: Probit Estimations.
Robust standard errors in ()
Marginal E¤ects in []
All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations
(i.e., Real GDP per capita, years under conict, primay enrollment,
diamond deposits, ethnic fractionalization)
Results are not reported to conserve space.
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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I II III IV V VI
State History -4.782*** -4.845*** -4.830*** -4.989*** -5.120*** -5.217***
(1.409) (1.442) (1.415) (1.453) (1.453) (1.485)
[ 1:809] [ 1:837] [ 1:809] [ 1:897] [ 1:938] [ 1:970]
Slave Exports 0.108 0.089 0.133 0.091 0.125 0.123
(0.081) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.091)
French Colony 0.384 -0.357
(0.426) (0.810)
Portugeuse Colony -0.950 -1.404
(0.954) (1.152)
British Colony -0.355 -0.748
(0.406) (0.781)
Other Colony 0.682
(0.755)
Constant 1.817 2.368 1.743 1.882 0.379 1.354
(2.802) (2.960) (2.841) (2.853) (3.160) (3.016)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Pseudo R-squared 0.3336 0.3422 0.3451 0.3415 0.3423 0.3597
Table 5: Probit Estimations.
Robust standard errors in ()
Marginal E¤ects in []
All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations
(i.e., Real GDP per capita, years under conict, primay enrollment,
diamond deposits, ethnic fractionalization)
Results are not reported to conserve space.
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
16
I II III IV V VI VII
State History -4.485*** -5.334*** -5.703*** -4.652*** -53.324* -4.686*** -17.653***
(1.694) (1.856) (2.344) (1.714) (60.376) (2.150) (9.291)
[ 1:103] [ 1:261] [ 0:337] [ 1:104] [ 0:312] [ 5:19e  17]
Slave Exports 0.022
(0.116)
French Colony -0.929
(1.065)
Portugeuse Colony -0.914
(1.303)
British Colony -1.156
(0.923)
Civil LIberties 1.642***
(0.544)
Political Status -0.324
(0.385)
Government E¤ectiveness -82.359*
(101.492)
Rule of Law -3.551***
(1.348)
Voice and Accountability -15.987***
(10.178)
Constant 1.331 -1.463 -4.842 1.175 37.598 8.369 55.805
(3.525) (4.708) (4.946) (3.609) (66.029) (5.963) (39.353)
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Pseudo R-squared 0.4015 0.4251 0.6398 0.4107 0.9038 0.6549 0.8336
Table 6: Probit Estimation (Extreme Fragility)
Robust standard errors in (), Marginal E¤ects in []
All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations
Results are not reported to conserve space.
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
State -6.220** -5.726* -5.899** -6.101** -6.818** -6.111** -6.297** 293.577*** -4.416* 9.300
History (2.819) (2.972) (2.931) (3.038) (2.708) (3.071) (2.916) (37.099) (2.533) (10.703)
Slave 0.022 0.018 -0.026 0.025
Exports (0.154) (0.197) (0.161) (0.177)
French 0.205
Colony (1.111)
Portugal 0.270
Colony (1.253)
British -0.624
Colony (0.876)
Other 1.510
Colony (1.259)
Civil 1.628***
Liberties (0.673)
Political -0.486
Status (0.556)
Gov 478.121***
E¤ective (58.530)
Rule -3.076**
of Law (1.526)
Voice 12.106
(8.9618)
Constant 1.340 2.336 1.672 0.988 -5.480 1.628 0.4578 -228.197 6.050 -45.340
(5.345) (7.611) (6.374) (5.545) (9.609) (0.673) (5.758) (32.041) (7.964) (34.162)
Obs. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Table 7: ReLogit Estimations (Extreme Fragility)
Robust standard errors in ()
All control variables used in Table 3 are included in the estimations
Results are not reported to conserve space.
0.01 signicance ***; 0.05 signicance **; 0.1 signicance *
18
